

In this talk, I will explore the semantics of German final clauses introduced by *um* and *damit* against the background of their combinatorial potential with attitude verbs. The subordinate clauses introduced by *damit* (finite) or *um* (non-finite) express, in their most common use, a future-directed desire that is motivationally involved in the bringing about of some matrix eventuality. This is called a ‘final’ meaning in traditional descriptive literature.

- (1) a. *Susi machte die Musik lauter, um ihre Nachbarn zu ärgern.*  
Susi made the music louder UM her neighbours to annoy  
‘Susi turned up the music in order to annoy her neighbours.’
- b. *Susi machte die Musik lauter, damit sich ihre Nachbarn ärgern.*  
Susi made the music louder DAMIT themselves her neighbours  
get.angry  
‘Susi turned up the music in order that her neighbours get angry.’

When combined with a non-action or an involuntary action, the result is infelicitous.

- (2) # *Susi hat im Lotto gewonnen, um ihre Schulden zurückzahlen zu können.*  
Susi has in.the lottery won UM her debt pay.back to be.able  
int.: ‘Susi won the lottery in order to be able to pay back her debt.’

There are two common paraphrases that can be used as a basis for a semantic analysis of final clauses, the causal paraphrase (3), and what I will call the enabling paraphrase (4) (Sæbø 1991).

- (3) **Causal paraphrase** for [*p* UM/DAMIT *q*]: (i) *p* and (ii) *q* is wanted and (iii) *p* because *q* is wanted.
- (4) **Enabling paraphrase** for [*p* UM/DAMIT *q*]: (i) *p* and (ii) *q* is wanted and (iii) *p* supposedly enables *q*.

I present data involving attitude verbs like *hope* and *want* that present a challenge to both types of analyses (5). To the extent that neither of these attitudes denote an intentional action (and I will argue that they don’t), the data are puzzling.

- (5) *Peter hofft, dass Susi zu Besuch kommt, damit er sie etwas fragen kann.*  
Peter hopes that Susi to visit comes DAMIT he her something ask  
can  
‘Peter hopes that Susi will visit him in order/so that he can ask her something.’

I discuss ways in which the analyses could deal with these types of data and I propose a tentative solution for the problem in favor of the causal paraphrase by assuming that intentional action implies the same kind of attitude holder that is evoked by preferential attitudes.