In this talk, I will explore the semantics of German final clauses introduced by *um* and *damit* against the background of their combinatorial potential with attitude verbs. The subordinate clauses introduced by *damit* (finite) or *um* (non-finite) express, in their most common use, a future-directed desire that is motivationally involved in the bringing about of some matrix eventuality. This is called a ‘final’ meaning in traditional descriptive literature.

(1) a. *Susi machte die Musik lauter, um ihre Nachbarn zu ärgern.*
   ‘Susi turned up the music in order to annoy her neighbours.’

   b. *Susi machte die Musik lauter, damit sich ihre Nachbarn ärgern.*
   ‘Susi turned up the music in order that her neighbours get angry.’

When combined with a non-action or an involuntary action, the result is infelicitous.

(2) *Susi hat im Lotto gewonnen, um ihre Schulden zurückzahlen zu können.*
   ‘Susi won the lottery in order to be able to pay back her debt.’

There are two common paraphrases that can be used as a basis for a semantic analysis of final clauses, the causal paraphrase (3), and what I will call the enabling paraphrase (4) (Sæbø 1991).

(3) **Causal paraphrase** for \([p \text{ UM/DAMIT } q]\): (i) \(p\) and (ii) \(q\) is wanted and (iii) \(p\) because \(q\) is wanted.

(4) **Enabling paraphrase** for \([p \text{ UM/DAMIT } q]\): (i) \(p\) and (ii) \(q\) is wanted and (iii) \(p\) supposedly enables \(q\).

I present data involving attitude verbs like *hope* and *want* that present a challenge to both types of analyses (5). To the extent that neither of these attitudes denote an intentional action (and I will argue that they don’t), the data are puzzling.

(5) *Peter hofft, dass Susi zu Besuch kommt, damit er sie etwas fragen kann.*
   ‘Peter hopes that Susi will visit him in order/so that he can ask her something.’

I discuss ways in which the analyses could deal with these types of data and I propose a tentative solution for the problem in favor of the causal paraphrase by assuming that intentional action implies the same kind of attitude holder that is evoked by preferential attitudes.